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MEMO 112/86 Brussels, 8 October 1986 
NOT ATTRIBUTABLE 
COMMISSION CHALLENGES IN GAIT THE us..:JAPANESE AGREEMENT 
ON SEMI-CONDUCTORS 
Background briefing for the Press 
Malo features of the agreement 
The arrangement was concluded on 30 July this year and is 
scheduled to last for a period of five years, i.e. until 
31 July 1991. 
Its aim Is to suspend the anti-dumping proceedings Initiated 
in the United States against Imports of Japanese semi-
conductors; In return, the Japanese Government w I 11 ass I st 
efforts to Increase imports of semi-conductors Into Japan. 
To this end the Japanese Government wl I I monitor the price of 
the majority of semi-conductors exported to the United States 
so as to prevent dumping, and wi I I also monitor the prices of 
exports to other countries, Including the Community. 
. . 
It should be noted, first, that the agreement covers eight products 
and product categories, whereas the anti-dumping petitions lodged by 
US manufacturers concerned three types o1 semi-conductors. This 
suggests that the agreement goes wel I beyond the settlement of an 
anti-dumping issue and amounts to a specifl~ industrial and commercial 
strategy involving a key sector of world economic activity. 
A dangerous precedent and an act of discrimination against the 
European community 
The Commission's concern is based prlmari ly on two aspects of the 
agreement relating first to the markets in countries not party to the 
agreement and, secondly, to the question of access to the Japanese 
market. It Is a I so feared that the arrangement cont a Ins secret 
elauses, either In the "accompanying letters", detai is of which both 
the USA and Japan refuse to divulge, or in a provision agreed between 
the Industries concerned. 
1. Monitoring of the price of exports to countries other than the USA 
This constitutes an unprecedented interference In other countries' 
markets, the result of US pressures on the Japanese authorities. 
This action is contrary to the GATT anti-dumping code, under which It 
Is left to the sole Judgement of the country concerned, or In this 
case the Community, to decide whether or not to initiate an anti-
dumping measure concerning Its own market. 
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The United States apparently pressed Its Japanese partners on this 
point for two reasons: 
1. In order to Improve the competitive position of United States 
firms exporting semi-conductors to countries other than Japan; 
2. In order to avoid greater competition from firms In such countries 
which Incorporate Japanese semi-conductors In their finished 
products. 
One cannot, at this stage, form a clear picture of the consequences of 
this pol Icy. The Commission's experts nevertheless broadly expect 
three effects: 
lo the Community: the price of semi-conductors wl I I Increase 
the whole range to the detriment of consumers. Though It Is 
that for ~uropean manufacturers of semi-conductors this 
result In an Increase In their profit margJn, the same firms 







in the United States: a fairly spectacular increase In prices Is 
expected In the short term (we have already seen price increases 
of between 20% and 40% on some semi-conductors and there are 
market rumours of Increases of between 200% and 300%). Although US 
manufacturers of semi-conductors wl I I profit from this situation, 
It Is clear that consumers In the United States wl I I have to bear 
the consequences; 
In Japan: It cannot be denied that exporters wi I I. see their 
profits Increase substantially. There Is also a major strategic 
element. Besides the profits accruing to the manufacturers of 
Japanese semi-conductors, the whole Japanese electronics Industry 
wl 11 receive a further boost to Its already strong 
competitiveness, brought about by the exclusion of the Japanese 
market fom the price-fixing system laid down In the agreement. 
2. Improved access to the Japanese market 
Although officially the arrangement makes reference to GATT 
obl tgatlons, It Is I tkely that the clause In question wl 11 work manly 
to the benefit of US exporters, constituting thereby a discriminatory 
measure contrary to Article I of the GATT. 
There are rumours circulating to the effect that a secret clause 
povldes for a doubi log In five years of Japanese Imports of semi-
conductors, from which us firms would be the chief beneficiaries. us 
exporters currently account for around 10% of the Japanese market, 
with "others" - Including community exporters - representing only 1%. 
Apart from Its commercial and Industrial aspects, this clause would 
raise a fundamental pol ltlcal question for the European Community. 
This Is because the Japanese Government is committing Itself for the 
first time to achieving a quantified Import objective, a goal so far 







Should such a clause be appl led, It could very wel I result In 
discrimination against Europe to the advantage of the USA. 
A few statistics 
According to the most recent estimates, the European market for semi-
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In al I, Imports Into the Community account for 58.7% of consumption, 
the US share being 24% and Japan's share 11.3%. 
The other main suppl lers of semi-conductors are: Malaysia, Singapore, 
Hong Kong and the Phi I lppines. 

